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THE VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND:
BORN FROM A UNIQUE CONFLUENCE OF EVENTS
NOT LIKELY TO BE DUPLICATED
Robert S. Peck*
INTRODUCTION
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 struck the nation like a
series of rapid body blows, each with an increasingly deeper impact.
The sunny, placid day that greeted the East Coast that morning
quickly turned dark as the tragedy unfolded before our very eyes. As
a people, we will continue to experience its ramifications for years to
come. A widespread innocence about our place in the world was
snatched from us in deadly fashion. The safe haven we knew, far from
the terror experienced in other parts of the world, was no more; our
world suddenly became a more dangerous place. With the terrorist
strikes of September 11th, the country experienced its first foreign-
launched attack since Pearl Harbor some sixty years earlier. It
seemed clear that we were no longer immune from the ravages of war
that befalls so much of the rest of the planet.
The attacks effected a permanent change in America's geopolitical
stance. President George W. Bush, on the anniversary of the attacks,
told the nation that September 11th launched a "great struggle that
tests our strength, and even more our resolve," with a new mission "to
rid the world of terror" by pursuing "terrorists in cities and camps and
caves across the earth."' The President acknowledged that the attacks
were an assault "on the ideals that make us a nation," specifically ac-
knowledging our commitment to "liberty and equality."'2 Yet, even as
we reconsider our ideas about national security, travel safety and
America's place in the world, we have undertaken a course that raises
important questions about our approach to those ideas.3
* Robert S. Peck is President of the Center for Constitutional Litigation, P.C., Washington,
D.C. and is a member of the adjunct faculties at the law schools of American University and
George Washington University.
1. President's Remarks to the Nation at Ellis Island (Sept. 11, 2002), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020911-3.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
2. Id.
3. For a discussion of some of those issues, see, for example, Viet Dinh, Erwin Chemerinsky,
Christopher Stone & Jeffrey Rosen, Life After 9/11: Issues Affecting the Courts and the Nation,
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Just as it became necessary for us to rethink how we can combat
terrorism while preserving liberty, it was also necessary to rethink how
we redress the injuries visited upon people by a terrorist event of the
magnitude of September 11th. The establishment of the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 just ten days after the trag-
edy, and three days after it was first discussed, was one possible re-
sponse.4 Though some have suggested that it may be a model for
future disaster relief or even certain mass tort situations, it was the
product of a unique confluence of events not likely to be duplicated.
It is not the purpose of this Article to evaluate its wisdom or level of
success, but simply to explain, from one person's perspective, how it
came about.
II. THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
For me, as with most Americans, September 11, 2001 began quite
normally. My six-year-old son and I left for school from our home in
Virginia early that morning, taking our usual route past the west side
of the Pentagon. A short stretch of grass that included a helicopter
pad was all that separated the highway from the famous building.
Soon that side of the building would sport a gaping, smoking hole,
having been rammed by American Airlines Flight 77. Our usual
morning route would be closed to us for some time thereafter.
As I arrived at my office at 8:45 a.m. that morning, American Air-
lines Flight 11, heavy with fuel for its transcontinental flight from Bos-
ton to Los Angeles, struck the north tower of the World Trade Center,
ripping a hole just above the ninety-sixth floor and spewing black
smoke and flames. 5 Word of the event quickly circulated throughout
the offices of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA),
where our law firm is located. Colleagues, still not fully understanding
that a terrorist event had occurred, huddled around television sets
wide-eyed at the pictures being broadcast. As I watched, I vividly re-
called when the buildings went up; my father was an electrician on the
buildings' construction crew. Then, at 9:03 a.m., United Airlines flight
175, also on a Boston-to-Los Angeles run, flew into the eightieth floor
51 U. KAN. L. REV. 219 (2003); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent
Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Michael F. Linz & Sarah E. Melt-
zer, Constitutional Issues After 9/11: Trading Liberty for Safety, FED. LAW, Jan. 2003, at 30.
4. It may not even be a very unique response. See Michele Landis Dauber, The War of 1812,
September 11th, and the Politics of Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 289 (2003).
5. CNN, September 11: Chronology of Terror (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.cnn.
com/20011US/09/11/chronology.attack/index.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
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of the south tower.6 No longer could this be a mere accident, a con-
clusion that President Bush confirmed at 9:30 a.m.7
Within minutes of the second plane crash, New York's airports, tun-
nels, and bridges were closed. At 9:40 a.m., for the first time in his-
tory, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) closed American
airspace to nonmilitary traffic. 8 The FAA later diverted transatlantic
flights heading for the United States to Canada.9 First the White
House and United Nations, then the State and Justice Departments,
as well as World Bank, and finally, all federal office buildings in Wash-
ington, D.C. and state office buildings in New York were evacuated. 10
A muted rumble, audible in the ATLA offices, sent us to our win-
dows overlooking the Potomac River. Despite obstructions that
blocked out any view of the Pentagon, billowing black smoke told the
story that the news reports would soon validate: American Airlines
Flight 77 from Washington's Dulles Airport had smashed into the
west side of the Pentagon. 1 We were stunned by these events as we
watched repeated replays of the World Trade Center crashes over and
over, unable to avert our eyes from the images. Suddenly, at 10:05
a.m., the south tower of the World Trade Center crumbled on screen
before our eyes. 12 Within minutes, the outer wall struck at the Penta-
gon also plummeted to the ground. And then the news reported that
another airliner, United Airlines Flight 93, headed from Newark, New
Jersey to San Francisco, had crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania
after making a u-turn toward Washington, D.C.13 Federal officials
speculated then that the plane was likely headed for the White House
or the Capitol.' 4
As people wondered aloud how many more airliners might come
crashing from the skies, the north tower of the World Trade Center
collapsed at 10:28 a.m.15 Soon, five warships and two aircraft carriers
were dispatched from the U.S. Naval Station in Norfolk, Virginia to
protect the East Coast from further attack.' 6 The Pentagon continued
to burn, though the fire was isolated. At 5:20 p.m., another building in
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. CNN, September 11: Chronology of Terror (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.cnn.
comI2001/USIO9/11/chronology.attack/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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the World Trade Center complex, damaged by the collapse of the twin
towers, fell, even as firefighters struggled to put out other nearby
fires. 17
Early estimates placed the death toll at nearly 7,000.18 Emergency
rescue workers tragically died, attempting to save others. The nation
was transfixed by the effort, which received saturation coverage, ena-
bling all viewers to feel as though they were experiencing the situation
first-hand. It was only some time later that more reliable figures es-
tablished that the death toll was 2,742 in New York, 19 189 at the Pen-
tagon, and all 44 passengers on the plane that crashed in
Pennsylvania. 20
On the evening of September 11th, in a television address to an
anxious nation, President Bush called the attacks "acts of mass mur-
der."'21 Soon, the country would be plunged into an all-encompassing
war on terrorism.
III. ATLA CALLS FOR A MORATORIUM
With good cause, trial lawyers strongly believe in the ability of law-
suits to deter future harmful behavior. Emblematic of this belief was
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,22 involving exploding fuel tanks in the
Ford Pinto. Ford's own crash tests of their economy car demonstrated
that rear-end collisions at as little as twenty-five miles per hour caused
a dangerous rupture of the fuel tank, yet Ford chose to make no
change.2 3 Ford also resisted compliance with existing federal regula-
tions.24 When the National Highway Transportation Safety Adminis-
tration (NHSTA) sought to strengthen fuel tank regulations, Ford
argued that the new regulations should be abandoned, or at least de-
ferred, because a cost-benefit analysis suggested the retooling re-
17. CNN, September 11: Chronology of Terror (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.cnn.
com2001/US/O9111chronology.attack/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
18. See Frank J. Murray, 10 Days That Shook the World, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at Al.
19. For more than a year, 2,792 had served as the authoritative figure. On October 29, 2003,
New York City officials lowered the death toll by an additional forty, citing incidence of fraud,
duplication and people alive, but thought dead. Investigators indicated that the toll could still be
lowered by two or three. Grant McCool, World Trade Center Sept. 11 Death Toll Lowered,
Reuters, Oct. 29, 2003, available at http://news/s/20031029/securitydeathtolldc.html (last visited
Nov. 16, 2003).
20. To Our Readers, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 11, 2002, at A2.
21. Statement by the President (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010912.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
22. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
23. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Product Liabil-
ity, 60 Mo. L. REV. 1, 78-79 (1995) (explaining the facts disclosed in Grimshaw prior to the
ruling).
24. Id. at 78.
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quired would not be economically worthwhile. 25 Ford estimated the
new regulations would cost the automotive industry $137.5 million but
would only prevent 360 deaths and injuries, which Ford estimated had
a value of $49.5 million.26
In essence, Ford argued that the regulations would result in $88 mil-
lion in unnecessary costs. The company would rather have paid dam-
ages for the deaths the vehicle's flaw would cause than spend the
money necessary to fix the problem. The Grimshaw decision pro-
vided the thumb on the scale that changed that calculation. In up-
holding a $3.25 million punitive damage award, reduced from $125
million, the court stated:
Through the results of the crash tests Ford knew that the Pinto's
fuel tank and rear structure would expose consumers to serious in-
jury or death in a 20 to 30 mile-per-hour collision. There was evi-
dence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects
at minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings
by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and
limbs against corporate profits. Ford's institutional mentality was
shown to be one of callous indifference to public safety. There was
substantial evidence that Ford's conduct constituted "conscious dis-
regard" of the probability of injury to the consuming public. 27
Grimshaw and a slew of other cases2 8 provide the paradigm for trial
lawyers' faith in litigation. When the regulatory system fails, tort law
can make a difference. Even where the regulatory system is function-
ing well, tort law complements and enhances its functionality. 29 The
effectiveness of tort law as a deterrent to wrongful conduct is not
based solely on anecdotal evidence. Existing empirical research sup-
ports the restraining effect of tort law.30
Tort law also has another salutary function besides compensation
and deterrence: investigation. Through the process of court-ordered
discovery and the adversarial back-and-forth, causes and effects can
be exposed that were otherwise unknown.
Trial lawyers' conviction that tort law can accomplish positive out-
comes that government investigations cannot was shared by Congress
25. Id. at 79.
26. Id. at 78-79.
27. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
28. For a book-length treatment of such cases, see CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE
GOOD FOR AMERICA (2001).
29. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 384-85 (1994).
30. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 10 (1987) ("[A]lthough there has been little systematic study of the deterrent effect of
tort law, what empirical evidence there is indicates that tort law likewise deters .... ).
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on at least one prior occasion when the issue was a remedy for those
injured by terrorist acts. The Civil Liability for Acts of State Spon-
sored Terrorism Act in 1997,31 also known as the "Flatow Amend-
ment," 32 creates a cause of action for personal injury or death against
an "official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state
sponsor of terrorism" who commits a terrorist act that injures a U.S.
national and when U.S. courts can maintain jurisdiction.33 The Act
reflects a market-based solution that avoids the establishment and ex-
penses of another bureaucracy that might be charged with similar
responsibilities.
Given this federal endorsement of tort litigation in response to ter-
rorism, coupled with trial lawyers' own experience, it should not be
surprising that some families of the September 11th victims immedi-
ately sought representation from lawyers who welcomed them
warmly. 34 It should also not be surprising that some lawyers believed
that the lapses in security and safety that enabled the hijackers to
commandeer the aircraft they used could be exposed and remedied
for the future through lawsuits.35 However, the leadership of ATLA
unanimously concluded that a slew of lawsuits at that time of shock
and grief was precisely the wrong response. So, for the first time in
the Association's history, just one day after the terrible events, it is-
sued a call for a moratorium on all lawsuits. The call issued by ATLA
President Leo Boyle was sufficiently significant that it merits re-
printing in full here:
America's trial lawyers join the nation in mourning the tragic loss
we all experienced as a result of coordinated terrorist acts against
America. Our sincere condolences go out to the victims and to their
families.
31. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-172 (1997) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (Supp. V 2000)).
32. The name is a reference to Alisa Flatow, an American college student killed in a suicide
attack in Israel. Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 330 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note.
34. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Lawyers Group Wants Moratorium on Attack Lawsuits, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 14, 2001, at E3 (indicating that families had begun to contact lawyers); Abdon M.
Pallasch, For Once, Lawyers Reluctant To Sue: Victims' Relatives Seek Legal Action, but Morato-
rium Urged, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 17, 2001, at 22.
35. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Lawyers May Bypass Victim Fund: Some Consider Filing Suits
over Attacks, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2001, at El. See also The Fault Line: Lawsuits Wrong Way to
Fight Terrorism, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 2002, at 16A (reporting on the efforts of former
Transportation Inspector General Mary Schiavo, who believes that there is liability on the part
of airlines, airport-security companies, aircraft manufacturers, flight schools, and the Federal
Aviation Administration, to use lawsuits for victims of the September llth tragedy to answer
questions and change security).
[Vol. 53:209
A UNIQUE CONFLUENCE OF EVENTS
Today, we must enter a period of national unity that should set us
on a course of comfort and care for the families who have exper-
ienced this national tragedy in the most personal of ways. It should
also be a course of renewal and resolve, where our American ideals
continue as our true guideposts and national security is pursued
with vigor and purpose.
It is not, as some would have it, a time for finger-pointing among
our own people. We, as a nation, must speak with a single voice, a
voice of compassion for the victims and a voice of authority to those
who would tear down our society.
For this reason, for the first time in our history, the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) is calling for a moratorium on
lawsuits arising out of the events of September 11. There are
greater needs that must be served at this time.
Let this instead be a time for healing, with our anger reserved for
the terrorists who perpetrated this tragedy. ATLA is prepared to
work with Congress and the administration to help find justice for
and assistance to the victims of Tuesday's tragedy. Let us act as one
nation in locating those responsible for this heinous act and in tak-
ing the necessary steps to prevent its recurrence. 36
The response to the indefinite moratorium was gratifying. Though
ATLA had no coercive authority over its members or the many trial
lawyers who were not members, the moral authority of the morato-
rium was undeniable. The moratorium held for a long time, even then
being breached only by a mere handful of lawsuits. 37 One of the first
was by an insurer seeking to limit its exposure. 38 Another sought
damages from Osama bin Laden and other terrorists.39 These lawsuits
were not within the scope of the moratorium.
ATLA also joined the outpouring of generosity from the public,40
creating the ATLA-911 Heroes Fund to facilitate contributions from
the trial lawyer community. 41
36. ATLA President's statement (on file with author).
37. Frank J. Murray, Lawsuit Freeze Promises Speedy Relief; Moratorium by Lawyers, New
Federal Law Stem Rush to Courthouse for Now, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2001, at A7; William
Glaberson, 4 Suits Filed, Despite Call for Restraint by Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A13
(reporting that four lawsuits had been filed but that the moratorium was still holding up other-
wise); A Matter of Time; So Much for Moratorium on Terror Lawsuits, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Jan. 17, 2002, at B16.
38. Stephen Labaton, A Nation Challenged: Liability; Insurer Sues To Limit Its Payout for
World Trade Center, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at B5.
39. Mark Hamblett, Bin Laden Named in Suit: N.J. Widow Files First Action Stemming from
Sept. 11 Attack, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 22, 2001, at A4.
40. Contributions flowed in from the public at a pace that charities could not handle. In seven
weeks' time, the Red Cross collected about $500 million and then sought to discourage further
giving for a time. Jacqueline L. Salmon, Red Cross Stops Seeking Donations to September 11
Fund, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2001, at A20.
41. Leo Boyle, President's Page: September 11, 2001, TRIAL, Oct. 2001, at 9.
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IV. AIRLINE BAILOUT GIVES RISE TO VICTIMS' FUND
On the heels of the tragedy, an already economically strapped air-
line industry42 began an immediate campaign for federal assistance.
The ban on air traffic in the nation's skies only exacerbated the slide
toward bankruptcy that several carriers were experiencing. Although
the skies were closed for just two and one-half days, businesses began
to explore video conferencing and other alternatives to travel. 43 Fami-
lies were canceling trips.44 By early October, the airlines had run up
losses of more than $1 billion.45
Specifically, the airlines sought low-interest loans, antitrust relief to
allow the companies to coordinate schedule reductions, increased
compensation through U.S. Department of Defense contracts, and re-
lief from fuel taxes.46 Another key component of their lobbying effort
was immunity from liability connected with injury and property losses
at the World Trade Center and Pentagon, even while accepting liabil-
ity for loss of life aboard their planes. 47 A $15 billion package of
grants and credit was proposed. 48  Though the need was palpable,
there was an unseemly quality to the request for immunity at a time
when public concern and sympathy for the victims was still at its apo-
gee. ATLA raised objections to the liability limitations unless some-
thing was done for the victims. ATLA President Boyle said the
airlines "should refrain from seeking a roll-back of rights of the po-
licemen, firemen, office workers and anyone else that was on the
ground." 49
42. Before the September 11th attacks, "the airline industry was expecting its worst losses in a
decade-about $2 billion-because of a sharp drop in business travel." Marilyn Adams, Airlines
Edge Near Bankruptcy, Cut Flights, USA TODAY, Sept. 17, 2001, at Bi. Several airlines teetered
toward bankruptcy. Laurence Zuckerman, After the Attacks: Financial Struggles; Airlines, in
Search of Relief Warn of Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at Al.
43. See Rick Barrett, Closer to Home; Teleconferencing Offers an Alternative to Costly Travel,
Mil. J. Sentinel, May 13, 2002, at 1D.
44. Susan Levine & Sabrina Jones, Many Families Revisiting Holiday Travel Tradition: Most
Decide Against Skipping the Trip, but Fewer Are Flying for Thanksgiving Get Togethers, WASH.
POST, Nov. 16, 2001, at B1.
45. Edmund Sanders, Federal Board May Decide Which Airlines Will Survive, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2001, at Cl.
46. Keith Alexander, Airlines Consulted on Bailout Package, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001;
Lizette Alvarez & Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: The Lobbying: Airline Industry Confi-
dent About Proposed Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at C3.
47. John D. McKinnon et al., U.S. Moves Toward Aid Pool of $40 Billion, WALL ST. J., Sept.
14, 2001, at A3.
48. Deirdre Shesgreen & Cynthia Wilson, Congressional Leaders Work on Bailout Plans for
Airlines, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 2001, at 11; Joseph B. Treaster, After the Attacks:
The Liability; Airlines Seek to Limit Lawsuits over Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A19.
49. Marilyn Adams, Airlines Edge Near Bankruptcy, Cut Flights, USA TODAY, Sept. 17, 2001,
at B1.
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ATLA realized the dire straits that the airlines were in and that
their $1.5 billion per plane insurance policies would not go very far in
compensating personal injury and death, property damage, and busi-
ness opportunity claimants. It argued that a compensation package
for the victims had to be part of any relief package Congress might
enact for the airlines. 50 Many believed the federal government bore
at least some responsibility for the tragedy, assigning some of the
blame to regulatory lapses implicated in the security blunders. The
issue of victim compensation, along with New York City's request for
federal assistance, delayed consideration of the airlines' initial
bailout.51 As their stocks and financial condition, as well as insurabil-
ity, continued to plummet, the airlines increased their federal request
to $24 billion.
It became apparent on September 19, 2001 that some type of
bailout would occur. The White House was readying a $5 billion cash
package for the airlines that included liability protections, as ATLA
President Boyle met with House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt
to discuss the victims. 5 2 Word filtered back to our offices on Septem-
ber 20 that Congress was considering a more generous package than
that proposed by the President and that we should begin to draft a
proposed victims' compensation system. Something would happen
very quickly.
V. THE ATLA VERSION OF VICTIMS' COMPENSATION
TAKES SHAPE
Time was short to get a draft to Capitol Hill. With a premium
placed on speed, I was asked to hunker down with ATLA's Director
of National Affairs, Daniel Cohen, and Karen Marangi, an associate
at Patton Boggs LLP and former Senate Judiciary counsel, to create a
possible direction for such legislation.
A. Models Examined and Considered
There was no time to research existing models that might serve as a
basis for a fund. I was familiar with the approach to compensation
taken in the Black Lung Benefits Act 53 and rejected that approach as
inappropriate. The Act was designed to provide benefits to coal min-
50. Julie Kosterlitz, Who Counts?, NAT'L J., May 4, 2002, at 1296.
51. Frank Swoboda & Martha McNeil Hamilton, Congress Passes $15 Billion Airline Bailout,
WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2001, at Al.
52. Lizette Alvarez & Laura M. Holson, White House To Seek $5 Billion as Part of Airline
Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at Cl.
53. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000).
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ers "totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and to the surviving de-
pendents of minors whose death was due to such disease. '5 4 To be
eligible for benefits, claimants had to prove total disability based on
pneumoconiosis suffered as a result of coal-mine employment.5 5 By
judicial interpretation, a presumption exists that the elements of eligi-
bility are met when pneumoconiosis is combined with coal-mine em-
ployment of at least ten years' duration. 56
Black-lung claims were once processed by the Social Security Ad-
ministration and later by the Department of Labor.57 The benefits
paid are very limited. In fiscal year 2001, $393,177,000 in benefits
were paid to 57,140 claimants.58 The average payout was, thus, just
$6,880.94. For 2003, the monthly benefit rate was $534.59
The Black Lung program has been the subject of considerable criti-
cism. 60 Issues of proof still plague the system.61 Even from my rough
familiarity, it did not seem like a model worth pursuing.
I was also familiar with the Price-Anderson Act. 62 It, particularly as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, seemed a more
promising model. The Act's purposes seemed to match well with the
purposes that a victims' compensation system would have. The Price-
Anderson Act sought to encourage the development of nuclear en-
ergy by private industry,63 while also ensuring compensation for inju-
ries and damages caused by a nuclear accident. 64
When the Nuclear Regulatory Commission declares an "extraordi-
nary nuclear occurrence," the Act comes into play. The Price-Ander-
son Act sets up a system of strict liability in which all defenses are
waived.65 Claimants merely need to prove that their injuries result
54. Id. § 901(a).
55. Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 141 (1987).
56. Id. at 141-42.
57. Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. Solomons, The Federal Black Lung Program: Its Evolution
and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 665, 674 (1989).
58. Catalog of Domestic Federal Assistance, § 17.307: Coal Mine Workers' Compensation,
available at http://www.cfda.gov/static/17307.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
59. Dir. of Coal Mine Workers' Compensation, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Black Lung Monthly
Benefits Rate for CY 2003, available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/owcp/blbene2k.
htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
60. See, e.g., Brian C. Murchison, Due Process, Black Lung, and the Shaping of Administrative
Justice, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1025 (2002).
61. William S. Mattingly, Black Lung Update: The Evolution of the Current Regulations and
the Proposed Revolution, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 601, 601 (1998).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000).
63. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978).
64. Id. at 86 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 90 (citing 42 U.S.C. §2210(n) (Supp. V 1970).
[Vol. 53:209
A UNIQUE CONFLUENCE OF EVENTS
from a nuclear power plant accident. 66 The Act limits plants' liability
to $560 million for all claims arising from a single nuclear incident. 67
To be eligible for the benefits of Price-Anderson, nuclear licensees
must have $160 million in private insurance and contribute up to $10
million per year (up to a total of $63 million) to a pool of funds that is
designed to total $7 billion.
The constitutionality of the Act was challenged in Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.68 One of the arguments
propounded by the challengers was that due process requires that "a
legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recov-
ery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy. '69 The
Court found that it did not have to definitively determine the validity
of that argument, even if the Court had articulated such a requirement
some sixty years earlier.70 It said that there was no need to enunciate
such a test, if indeed the Constitution mandates that analysis, because
the Court held that the Price-Anderson Act "provide[d] a reasonably
just substitute for the common-law or state tort law remedies it re-
places. ' 71 The Court took a similar approach a few years later when it
upheld the President's authority to substitute a claims tribunal capable
of providing meaningful relief for private litigation claims against Iran
after the hostage crisis of the mid-1970s. 72
Two elements were critical to the Duke Power Court's conclusion
that Price-Anderson constituted "a reasonably just substitute" for tort
remedies. First, as already indicated, the Act required that the nu-
clear industry waive all defenses. Such a provision was sufficiently
similar to workers' compensation statutes, which abolished negligence
liability and certain damages for employers while entitling workers to
compensation for economic losses without regard to fault.73
66. Id.
67. Id. at 65.
68. 438 U.S. 59.
69. Id. at 88.
70. See New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917), in which the Court
stated that the government may not, "without violence to the constitutional guaranty of 'due
process of law,' suddenly set aside all common-law rules respecting liability ... without providing
a reasonably just substitute." It reached that conclusion even while adhering to the notion that
"[n]o person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to insist that it shall remain
unchanged for his benefit." Id. at 198.
71. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 88.
72. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 687 (1981).
73. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 93 (citing N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. 188).
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This type of quid pro quo requirement is often found in state consti-
tutional analysis. 74 Moreover, and significantly, Congress established
itself in Price-Anderson as a guarantor against liability in excess of the
$560 million ceiling,75 assuring full compensation of each injured
claimant.
The Court's vision of the Price-Anderson Act was utterly appealing
for the task of creating a compensation program. It assured that
plaintiffs who might give up their right to trial by jury would still have
an opportunity to seek full compensation without needing to prove
fault in a manner that was constitutionally sound. With that idea in
mind, the drafting process was quickly undertaken.
B. Article I Court or Special Master?
Following the Price-Anderson model, the ATLA draft76 created a
non-adversarial proceeding where only two issues existed: eligibility
and the amount of damages suffered. To hear those issues, the draft
created an Article I court. 77 Congress instead opted for a special
master within the Justice Department.
The decision to create an Article I court was premised on the idea
that a special court, created for that singular purpose, was most likely
to serve the needs of the victims without the distractions and demands
of its regular docket. It would also be capable of some flexibility of
procedure attuned to the sole issues of eligibility and damage. Such a
court could also justifiably consolidate all claims before it.78 Congress
had long employed its Article I authority to establish "legislative
courts. '79 In one of the leading cases, a plurality of the Supreme
74. See, e.g., Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985); Kluger v. White,
281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973); State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 97 N.E. 602, 607 (Ohio 1912). See also
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("[Tihere are limits on governmental authority to abolish core common-law rights .... at least
without a compelling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy.").
75. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 65, 66-67, 85-87.
76. This draft, which was more on the order of an outline, is reproduced in the Appendix to
this Article.
77. See attached appendix.
78. For a survey of the use of such courts, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudi-
cation, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 377.
79. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (recognizing authority to
establish legislative courts by "virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the gov-
ernment, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regula-
tions, respecting the territory belonging to the United States"); see also Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,
279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929) ("[I]t long has been settled that Article III does not express the full
authority of Congress to create courts, and that other articles invest Congress with powers in the
exertion of which it may create inferior courts and clothe them with functions deemed essential
or helpful in carrying those powers into execution.").
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Court recognized "three narrow situations" in which jurisdiction may
properly be vested in legislative courts.80 First, Congress may create
courts for territories, because within a federal territory the federal
government remains the sovereign. 81 Second, it may create military
courts pursuant to congressional power to maintain and set rules for
the armed forces of the United States.82 Third, it may create courts
"to adjudicate cases involving 'public rights." 83 It was within that
realm that the ATLA draft would have established a September 11th
compensation court.
The public rights doctrine of adjudication was first recognized by
the Court in 1856 in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improve-
ment Co.84 There, the Court said:
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented
in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them,
and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which Con-
gress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of
the United States, as it may deem proper."85
At the same time, the Court recognized that Congress may not
withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its na-
ture, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or
admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial
power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for judicial
determination. 86
Essentially, the doctrine recognizes that where "Congress would be
free to commit such matters completely to nonjudicial executive de-
termination,.., there can be no constitutional objection to Congress's
employing the less drastic expedient of committing their determina-
tion to a legislative court or an administrative agency."'87
Concurring in that decision, then-Justice Rehnquist noted that the
jurisprudence surrounding legislative courts does not admit of easy
synthesis.88 Several years later, the Court relaxed the standards of re-
view further. First, in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
Co.,8 9 the Court approved an adjudicatory scheme that put a federal
80. N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
81. Id. at 64-65.
82. Id. at 66.
83. Id. at 67.
84. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
85. Id. at 284.
86. Id.
87. N. Pipeline Const. Co., 458 U.S. at 68 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
88. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
89. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
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arbitrator in charge of determining compensation for a registrant with
the Environmental Protection Agency when a subsequent registrant
made use of the prior person's data submission. The arbitrator's de-
terminations were subject to review by an Article III court only for
"fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct." 90 The Court made
much of congressional intent to assure the quick resolution of claims
and a process that was fundamentally fair. 91 A reflection of that fun-
damental fairness was found in the provision for limited review in an
Article III court.92
Then, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,93 the
Court approved adjudication of a state law cause of action, as a coun-
terclaim, before the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Be-
cause Congress had asserted an interest in providing an "inexpensive
and expeditious alternative" to litigation in courts or arbitration 94 and
the parties had submitted themselves to the tribunal's jurisdiction,
thereby waiving any constitutional objection,95 the Court found any
intrusion on judicial interests to be "de minimis. ,,96
Schor enunciated four guidelines to evaluating the use of an Article
I court: (1) "the extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial
power' are reserved to Article III courts"; 97 (2) "the extent to which
the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and pow-
ers normally vested only in Article III courts"; 98 (3) "the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated"; 99 and (4) "the concerns
that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article
III."100
It seemed patently clear that a September 11th compensation court
would satisfy these guidelines. Before such a court, a nonadversarial
system of paying claims from taxpayer funds would be established that
is different from the traditional form of courtroom adjudication; juris-
diction for the court would be extremely circumscribed; the origins of
the events that gave rise to the claims heard were peculiarly unique;
90. Id. at 573-74 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
91. Id. at 592-93.
92. Id.
93. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
94. Id. at 836, 855.
95. Id. at 848.
96. Id. at 856.
97. Id. at 851.
98. Id.
99. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
100. Id.
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and the likelihood that the normal processes might be incapable of
redressing these injuries was palpable.
Moreover, the court's purpose was, similarly, to create an "inexpen-
sive and expeditious alternative" to traditional litigation-litigation
that was likely to be unsatisfactory to anyone. After all, the airlines
had only $1.5 billion in insurance on each of the four airplanes hi-
jacked. With the wealth of injury, property damage, and business op-
portunities claims on those funds existent, the available compensation
would be doled out quickly and the remaining assets of the airlines
would similarly disappear rapidly, long before the claims were
satisfied.
The ATLA draft anticipated that the President would appoint a
person to serve as the presiding judge of the court, subject to the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, for a term of not more than five years.
The judge was subject to removal by the Attorney General for good
cause. The judge also had all necessary authority to promulgate the
procedural and substantive rules necessary to dispose of claims. In-
stead, Congress created a Special Master appointed by the Attorney
General.
We assumed that no single person could hear all the claims likely to
inundate the tribunal.'10 Thus, the presiding judge was responsible for
hiring an appropriate number of hearing officers and other necessary
administrative staff to oversee the work of the court. In line with al-
ready-existing congressional sentiment, the court was to be located
within and be affiliated with the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
C. Funding the Compensation
The ATLA draft imagined full compensation for the victims, though
the drafters had no confidence that the legislation would end up there.
As a result, we made no attempt to define that compensation. Con-
gress, however, endorsed the full compensation approach. Rather
than create a budget for the Fund and subsequently appropriate
101. After Congress designated a Special Master, rather than an Article I court, to hear
claims, Washington lawyer Kenneth Feinberg was appointed to the daunting task. He personally
undertook responsibility to hear as many claims as possible and provide a final level of review in
all cases, while also reaching out publicly to the victims and victims' families. For a profile of
that outreach, see Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator: How Kenneth Feinberg Determines the
Value of Three Thousand Lives, NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002, at 42. Perhaps the claims had
begun to reach the levels we anticipated a year after his appointment. In September 2002, Fein-
berg announced that he had invited forty-one prominent retired judges, lawyers, and professors
to serve as hearing officers. David W. Chen, Legal Heavyweights To Help Decide Sept. 11 Fund
Appeals. N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at BI.
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funds, it created the first federal entitlement program in decades.
Through its act in creating the Fund, Congress deemed whatever com-
pensation awards made by the Special Master to be "the obligation of
the Federal Government." 102 Congress also enumerated the compen-
sable damages.
Compensable economic loss embraced "any pecuniary loss ... in-
cluding the loss of earnings or other benefits related to employment,
medical expense loss, replacement services loss ... burial costs, and
loss of business or employment opportunities .... ,,03 Compensable
noneconomic loss included "physical and emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement,
loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of
consortium ... hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all other
nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature.'0 4 The breadth of damages
endorsed, particularly the inclusion of hedonic damages, was stunning.
Although the ATLA draft provided that compensation received
from the Fund was to be in addition to any other compensation for
which the recipient was eligible due to the injury or death sustained,
Congress provided for the reduction of awards by collateral source
benefits, such as life insurance, pension funds, and other government
payments. 10 5 Still, supporters of the Fund were confident that it pro-
vided a better alternative than a lawsuit, a possibility the law left
unimpaired if a claimant did not choose the Fund option. The Fund's
superiority was the result of its promise of full compensation without
the need for proof of causation and liability and without the difficul-
ties that collection of any judgment would present.
D. Eligibility for Benefits
Like Congress, the ATLA draft provided broad eligibility for the
benefits established by the Victim Compensation Fund. The draft
simply permitted any individual who suffered injuries due to the ter-
rorist-related airline attacks on September 11, 2001, or their spouses,
children, parents and other dependents, to seek compensation from
this Fund.10 6 Congress extended eligibility to physical injury or
wrongful death claims of individuals or relatives of someone killed "as
a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11,
102. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §406(b), 115
Stat. 230, 240 (2001).
103. Id. § 402(5).
104. Id. § 402(7).
105. Id. § 405(b)(6).
106. See attached appendix.
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2001."107 The Special Master subsequently ruled that "relatives"
could include same-sex partners. 0 8
E. Procedure
Under the system we proposed, the staff of the September 11th
compensation court would make an initial determination of the appli-
cant's eligibility for compensation and appropriate level of compensa-
tion within ninety days of having received the application. Under the
statute, the Special Master has 120 days to make a written determina-
tion of the claim.' 0 9 Although we provided for review by a hearing
officer at the September 11th compensation court with witnesses and
other evidence and a subsequent final appeal to the district court,
Congress determined that the Special Master's decision was "final and
not subject to judicial review." 110
VI. ATLA CREATES MASSIVE PRO BONO EFFORT TO
SUPPORT FUND
Even as the Fund was taking shape, ATLA was considering other
ways in which it might respond to the tragedy of September 11th. In a
telephone conference call, without hesitation, its Executive Commit-
tee agreed that it would begin a massive recruitment effort to obtain
volunteer lawyers to represent victims before the Fund. When pas-
sage of the Fund became a certainty and efforts to enact limitations on
attorneys fees had failed, ATLA unveiled its pro bono effort by send-
ing a letter to the Senate that Senator Harry Reid read on the floor
during debate on the legislation.'11 Along with state trial lawyer as-
sociations in the affected areas, ATLA incorporated "Trial Lawyers
Care" (TLC) as a massive pro bono program'1 2 to represent victims
before the Fund.113 To undertake this representation, TLC opened
offices in New York and developed a significant training program for
the volunteer lawyers representing victims."14
107. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, §403.
108. See Steve Vogel, U.S. Awards Lesbian 9/11 Benefits for Loss of Partner, WASH. POST, Jan.
23, 2003, at B1.
109. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(3).
110. Id.
111. Leo Boyle, A Defining Moment, TRIAL, Nov. 2001, at 9.
112. Trial Lawyers Care may be the largest pro bono program every undertaken. Leo V.
Boyle, Victims Fund Will Work, but Don't Toss Torts. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at 53.
113. See Diana B. Henriques, Lawyers Offer Free Advice in Tapping Federal Fund, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15. 2001, at Bll.
114. For information about Trial Lawyers Care, see http://www.9111awhelp.org (last visited
Sept. 23, 2003).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 represents
one response to a national tragedy that inimitably touched all Ameri-
can lives. Some have raised questions about why such a response to
disaster should not be extended to victims of the bombings in
Oklahoma City and Nairobi or the downing of Pam Am Flight 103.115
Others have suggested that the Fund holds promise as a model for
resolving certain mass torts. 1 6 This seems unlikely. The origin of the
need, the outpouring of public sympathy, and the necessity for a rapid
response to save a failing airline industry combined to make possible
something that was otherwise unthinkable and appears unlikely to be
established again. Even if the future brings another mass-murder per-
petrated by foreign terrorists, it is difficult to imagine the event sear-
ing the soul as did September 11th, now a part of our everyday
lexicon. Would such an event also threaten a critical industry and pro-
vide the motivation for federal intervention? That, of course, is possi-
ble. Yet, a program of full compensation at public expense seems
unlikely to pass again. Let us pray that we do not have to find out.
115. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: Victims' Compen-
sation; Fund for Victims' Families Already Proves Sore Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at Al.
116. See, e.g., Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of Terrorism, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1265
(2002).
[Vol. 53:209
A UNIQUE CONFLUENCE OF EVENTS
APPENDIX
DRAFT
PROPOSED PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A SEPTEMBER 11th COMPENSATION FUND
Creation of the September 11th Compensation Fund
* Congress shall authorize and appropriate such funds as may be
necessary, up to billion, to compensate any individuals, and/or
their spouses, children, parents, or other dependents, who were in-
jured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related airline crashes in the
United States on September 11, 2001.
* Such funds shall be appropriated to a "September 11th Compensa-
tion Fund" (hereinafter "the Fund") to be established by the U.S.
Treasury and to be managed by a newly created "September 11th
Compensation Court" on or before October 30, 2001.
# The Fund shall also be authorized to receive contributions from
any insurance companies or any other entity that seeks to contribute.
• Individuals who suffered harm due to the terrorist-related airline
attacks on September 11, 2001, or their spouses, children, parents and
other dependents, shall have the right to seek compensation from this
Fund.
* The liability of the airlines involved in the terrorist-related airline
crashes on September 11, 2001 shall be limited to the amount of insur-
ance coverage they have for such incidents. The U.S. government will
have the right to seek subrogation against any airline, insurance com-
pany or other entity found to be responsible for payment of compen-
sation to the victims and their families.
* Congress shall also authorize and appropriate the necessary funds
to create and run the September 11th Compensation Court so it may
carry out its duties, as outlined below. This shall be carried out as a
separate appropriation.
0 The Fund shall first pay out any monies contributed by airlines,
insurance companies or other entities to the Fund. (Possible favorable
tax treatment to encourage payment into the Fund. Also payees
could be immunized from claims of subrogation from other insurers.)
Creation of the September 11th Compensation Court to Administer
the Fund
* The President shall appoint a person to serve as the Presiding
Judge of a newly created "September 11th Compensation Court"
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(hereinafter "the Court"). Such appointment shall be subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate and shall be made according to Arti-
cle I of the Constitution.
* The Presiding Judge of this newly established Court shall serve for
a term of not more than five years, and may be removed by the Attor-
ney General only for good cause. The Presiding Judge shall have the
authority to promulgate all procedural and substantive rules necessary
to administer the Fund.
0 The Presiding Judge shall be charged with hiring an appropriate
number of hearing officers and other appropriate administrative staff
to oversee the work of the Court.
* This Court shall be located within the Southern District of New
York, and shall be affiliated with the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York.
* The Presiding Judge shall have the authority to seek additional
funds from Congress, as appropriate, to administer the Fund.
Claims for Compensation
• Any individual who suffered injuries as a result of the terrorist-
related airline crashes on September 11th, 2001 may apply to the Fund
for compensation for such injuries. In addition, any spouse, child, par-
ent and/or other dependent of an individual who was injured or killed
as a result of the terrorist-related airline crashes on September 11th,
2001 may also apply to the Fund for compensation.
0 Any such compensation received from the Fund shall be in addi-
tion to any other compensation for which the individual or family
member is eligible due to the injury or death sustained.
; Applicants for compensation must apply to the Fund on or before
September 11, 2003. The Presiding Judge shall develop an appropri-
ate application form to be used by all such applicants which shall be
made available through appropriate government offices and online, if
possible.
• To be eligible for compensation, applicants will need to provide
adequate proof of the harm they or their family member suffered or
adequate proof of death linked to the terrorist-related airline crashes
on September 11, 2001. Applicants will not be required to prove cau-
sation or negligence.
* The application form will request information regarding any possi-
ble economic and non-economic damages that the claimant suffered
due to the terrorist-related airline crashes.
[Vol. 53:209
A UNIQUE CONFLUENCE OF EVENTS
Initial Determination of Eligibility for Compensation and Initial
Review
* The staff of the September 11th Compensation Court shall make
an initial determination of the applicant's eligibility for compensation
and appropriate level of compensation within 90 days of having re-
ceived the application.
* The applicant shall have 60 days from notification of this proposed
award of compensation to seek a review of this determination and a
hearing before a hearing officer at the September 11th Compensation
Court. If requested, any such hearing shall be held promptly.
* At any such hearing, the applicant shall have the right to have
counsel present, the right to present evidence (including, but not lim-
ited to witnesses and documents), and any other due process rights
determined appropriate by the Presiding Judge of the Court.
* Applicants shall retain their right to collect the initial compensa-
tion offered by the Fund, regardless of whether they seek a review or
appeal of the initial determination.
Right of Appeal to the U.S. District Court
* The applicant shall have 60 days from the date they are notified in
writing of the hearing officer's decision to appeal any such decision to
the appropriate U.S. District Court.
* Any determination of the applicant's eligibility for and level of
compensation by the U.S. District Court shall be a final decision with
no rights of further appellate review, except as otherwise provided by
law.
Payment of Compensation and Use of Funds
* The Fund shall promptly pay the compensation it is determined
they owe any applicant. In all cases, the compensation shall be paid
within 45 days of the final determination or exhaustion of appellate
rights.
& The monies in the Fund shall only be used to provide compensa-
tion for the individuals who were injured or killed as a result of the
terrorist-related airline crashes on September 11, 2001, and to com-
pensate the spouses, children, parents and other dependents of these
individuals.
* Reasonable attorneys' fees shall be available, as approved by the
Court.
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Other Issues
* Precise definition of terrorism exemption from prospective claims
to be determined.
